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1Advance Reservation Games
ERAN SIMHON and DAVID STAROBINSKI, Boston University
Advance reservation (AR) services form a pillar of several branches of the economy, including transportation, lodging, dining,
and more recently, cloud computing. In this work, we use game theory to analyze a slotted AR system in which customers
differ in their lead times. For each given time slot, the number of customers requesting service is a random variable following
a general probability distribution. Based on statistical information, the customers decide whether or not making an advance
reservation of server resources in future slots for a fee. We prove that only two types of equilibria are possible: either none of the
customers makes AR or only customers with lead time greater than some threshold make AR. Our analysis further shows that
the fee that maximizes the provider’s profit may lead to other equilibria, one of which yielding zero profit. In order to prevent
ending up with no profit, the provider can elect to advertise a lower fee yielding a guaranteed, but smaller profit. We refer to
the ratio of the maximum possible profit to the maximum guaranteed profit as the price of conservatism. When the number
of customers is a Poisson random variable, we prove that the price of conservatism is one in the single server case, but can be
arbitrarily high in a many-server system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: []
1. INTRODUCTION
Advance reservation services play a key role in several branches of the economy, such as transporta-
tion, lodging, dining, and health care. There has also been a growing interest in applying AR in cloud
computing systems [Sotomayor 2009]. For instance, Moab Workload Manager1 and IBM Platform
Computing Solutions2 support AR. In both of these packages, an administrator can decide whether or
not to enable AR and define an AR pricing scheme. In most systems supporting AR, customers can
choose whether making AR or not. Since the payoff of each customer is affected by decisions of other
customers, it is natural to analyze the behavior of such systems as strategic games.
In this paper, we study a set of strategic non-cooperative games, referred to as advance reservation
games, where players (customers) can reserve future resources in advance for a fee. Charging a reser-
vation fee is a common practice in different venues and is also used in cloud computing. For example,
Amazon EC2 cloud offers reserved instance service, in which customers pay a fee that allow them to
use resources later on for a lower cost.
Typically, advance reservations are offered when customers are sensitive to the service starting
point and will not agree to wait if service is not available when needed. Accordingly, we consider a loss
system where customers leave the system if they cannot get service at their desired time slots. In cloud
computing, this typically occurs when parallel computing is needed [Sotomayor 2009]. We assume that
the service time is slotted which is a common assumption in the literature of AR [Charbonneau and
Vokkarane 2012] due to the complexity of analyzing a continuous time queue that supports AR.
In loss systems, customers have a clear incentive of making AR to increase their chances to get
service. Likewise, the provider is also motivated to offer AR, since she can increase her overall profit
by charging an appropriate reservation fee. Upon deciding whether making AR or not, customers face
two uncertainties. The first uncertainty lies in the number of customers competing for the same set of
1See http://docs.adaptivecomputing.com/mwm/7-0/mwmAdminGuide-7.0.pdf.
2See http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks/pdfs/sg248073.pdf.
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resources in a given slot. We refer to this number as the demand, which is a random variable following
a general probability distribution.
The second uncertainty lies in the time at which other customers consider making AR. In the models
introduced in this paper, customers differ by their lead times, where the lead time of a customer is the
time elapsing between the point when he realizes that he will need service at a given time slot and
the starting time of that slot. The lead times of customers are continuous i.i.d. random variables that
follow a general distribution, but remain private (i.e., customers know the statistics but do not know
the realizations of the demand and the lead times of other customers).
To illustrate the model, consider the following example: a system with several servers has a slot du-
ration that lasts for one day, starting at 12:00 AM. A customer realizes on Monday 6:00 PM that he will
need service on Wednesday. Thus, his lead time is 30 hours. Upon realizing that service will be needed
on Wednesday, the customer can either reserve that slot in advance or avoid AR. The customer does
not know how many other customers wish to be served on that day. However, statistical information is
available to him.
The model assumes a monopolistic setting. Thus, the provider can choose any AR price and AR
mechanism that maximizes her expected profit. The profit has two sources: AR fees and service fees.
Since customers only decide whether making AR or not, their decisions have no impact on the number
of customers getting service in a given slot (their decisions only impact who get service). Hence, the
provider can ignore the profit obtained from service when choosing the AR price and AR mechanism.
For brevity, henceforth, profit means AR profit. We note that reservation fees are a major source of
revenue in several booking systems, including cloud computing [Aazam and Huh 2015].
In this paper, we evaluate different types of AR games and derive their Nash equilibria (we only
consider symmetric equilibria, a common assumption made in the literature of queueing games [Has-
sin and Haviv 2003]. For the games under consideration, we prove that only two types of equilibria
are possible: either none of the customers makes AR or only customers with lead time greater than
some threshold make AR.3 Furthermore, we show that, at equilibrium, informing customers that free
servers are available does not impact the provider’s expected profit. However, charging an AR fee from
all customers attempting AR (i.e., not only those granted service) can only decrease the expected profit.
Once a mechanism is chosen, another question arises: what is the AR fee that maximizes the
provider’s expected profit? The answer to this question turns out to be more complicated. We show
that there exists a range of fees, such that choosing a fee within this range leads to multiple equilib-
ria with one of them yielding zero profit. Therefore, in order to properly set the AR fee, the provider
should consider both the fee yielding the maximum possible profit and the fee yielding the maximum
guaranteed profit. For this purpose, we introduce the concept of price of conservatism (PoC), which
corresponds to the ratio of the maximum possible profit to the maximum guaranteed profit. We as-
sume that the demand follows a Poisson distribution and derive the price of conservatism in different
settings. First, we analyze the case of a single server, where we prove that PoC = 1 (i.e., no loss).
Next, we conduct the analysis of a many-server system and prove that the price of conservatism can
be arbitrarily high. This situation occurs when the system is slightly overloaded.
We note that since AR games are zero-sum games, the social welfare (i.e., the total payoff of all
players in the game, including the provider) is not affected by the decisions of the provider and cus-
tomers. Therefore, the price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] in such games always
equals one. In contrast, the price of conservatism measures the loss of profit from the viewpoint of the
provider.
3Although the former equilibrium, in which none of the customers make AR, could be viewed as a special case of the latter
equilibrium, distinguishing between the two equilibria is needed for the game analysis.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we cover related work. In Section 3,
we describe the different models. In Section 4, we analyze each model and find the equilibria structure.
In Section 5, we compare between the expected profits of the different models. In section 6, we define
the Price of Conservatism and compute it for different system sizes. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude
and suggest directions for future research.
2. RELATED WORK
Queueing systems and communication networks that support advance reservations have extensively
been researched for the past two decades. Most of the research focuses on performance evaluation
and algorithmic aspects of AR systems. For example, [Smith et al. 2000] propose a scheduling model
that supports AR and evaluate several performance metrics. [Kaushik et al. 2006] suggest an AR
model with flexible time window and show that this model has a lower blocking probability and a
higher utilization than a model without window. [Gue´rin and Orda 2000] analyze the effect of AR
on the complexity of path selection. [Virtamo 1992] evaluates the impact of advance reservation on
server utilization. [Buyya et al. 2009] report a simulation-based comparison between different payment
mechanisms. [Cohen et al. 2009] propose algorithms for network routing that support advance channel
reservations. For a survey on the field, see [Charbonneau and Vokkarane 2012].
Research on advance reservation can be also found in the literature on revenue management. For ex-
ample, [Liberman and Yechiali 1978] analyze a hotel reservation system where overbooking is allowed
and the goal is to find the optimal overbooking level. [Reiman and Wang 2008] propose an admission
control strategy for reservation system with different classes of customers. [Bertsimas and Shioda
2003] propose a policy for accepting/rejecting restaurant reservations.
The application of game theory to analyze customers’ behavior in queues (shortly, queueing games)
is pioneered by [Naor 1969]. In that paper, the author considers an M/M/1 queue where customers
observe the queue length and then decide whether to join or bulk. Follow-up work analyzed the behav-
ior of customers in other queueing models. [Edelson and Hilderbrand 1975] analyze an unobservable
M/M/1 queue, where customers decide whether to join or bulk without knowing the queue state.
[Altman and Shimkin 1998] analyze an observable processor sharing system, where customers de-
cide whether or not to join after observing the number of users in the system. [Balachandran 1972]
analyzes an observable M/M/1 queue with priorities, where customers decide on a payment and ac-
cordingly priorities are assigned. [Haviv et al. 2010] analyze an unobservable M/M/N/N system that
is initially empty and customers decide whether to join or bulk based on their arrival time. [Jain et al.
2011] introduce concert queueing games, where customers, interested in early service with minimal
wait, choose their arriving time into a system with a specific opening time. [Haviv and Roughgarden
2007] analyze an unobservable system with non-identical servers, where customers wish to minimize
their waiting time and select a server accordingly.
Several models of queueing games focus on revenue management. In those games, a provider designs
the system such that her revenue will be maximized. For example, [Masuda and Whang 2006] assume
that the pricing scheme is controlled by the provider and the goal is to find a pricing scheme that
maximizes the provider’s profit. Such types of games are a special case of Stackelberg games. In a
Stackelberg game, a leader (a provider, for instance) acts first, and followers (customers, for instance)
respond to the leader’s move. In our work, we follow a similar approach, where the objective of the
provider is to maximize her revenue from AR fees. For a review on the field of queueing games, see
[Hassin and Haviv 2003].
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Fig. 1. Slotted system with two servers. The demand for each slot is independent. The demand for slots 1, 2 and 3, is respectively
3, 2 and 2.
3. THE MODELS
First we describe the assumptions that are common to all three models:
(1) The system consists of N servers.
(2) The service time axis is slotted. That is, in each slot, customers are served from the beginning till
the end of the slot.
(3) The demand, which represents the number of customers that request service in a specific slot (each
customer requests one server) is a random variable. This formulation is common for slotted queues
(e.g., [Kang and Tan 1993] and [Blanchet et al. 2009]). The demand for slot i is denoted by Di.
(4) Customers that do not get service in a given slot do not make another trial (a common assumption
in the literature of loss systems [Ross 1995]). Thus, the demand in each slot is independent of the
history and follows a general distribution supported in N.
(5) The customers of each slot differ by the time elapsing between considering making AR (i.e, real-
izing that service will be needed in that future slot) and the slot starting time. We refer to this
time interval as the lead time of a customer. The lead times of all customers are independent and
identically distributed random variables, supported in R+, with cumulative distribution function
denoted F (·).
(6) Each customer chooses one of two actions: make AR or not make AR, denoted AR and AR′ respec-
tively.
(7) If the demand for a slot is larger than N , the servers are allocated to the first N customers that
made AR. If fewer than N customers made AR, the remaining servers are arbitrarily allocated
between the customers that did not make AR.
(8) The customers and the provider know the number of servers N and statistical information on the
system (i.e., the distribution of the demand and the lead times).
(9) The provider charges a fixed reservation fee denoted C. All the customers have the same utility U
from the service. Without loss of generality, we set U = 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the model. The models analyzed in this paper differ in their reservation mecha-
nisms as follows:
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Table I.
Pay-
off
sum-
mary
- Make AR Not make AR
Model Served Not
served
Served Not
served
1 and 3 1− C 0 1 0
2 1− C −C 1 0
(1) Unobservable model 1: customers have no information regarding the availability of servers at
the time of reservation. If a customer makes an AR request, he is then informed whether a server
will be allocated at the requested slot or not. In the first case, a reservation fee is charged. In the
second case, the customer leaves the system with no gain or cost.
(2) Unobservable model 2: as in Model 1, customers have no information regarding the availability
of servers at the time of reservation. In this model, however, a reservation fee is charged from each
customer that makes an AR request.
(3) Observable model: customers are informed, prior to their decision, if a server is available at
their requested time slot. A customer that has been informed that there is no free server leaves the
system.
We note that, in the observable model, customers leave the system if they see that no server is
available. Thus, a situation where a customer pays the AR fee but does not get service does not exist
in that model.
The possible payoffs of the three models are summarized in Table I.
4. EQUILIBRIA ANALYSIS
4.1 Classification of the equilibria
We analyze the three models as non-cooperative games where each player (customer) aims to maximize
his payoff. Since the demand for each slot is an i.i.d random variable, the analysis of a single slot is
sufficient for analyzing the game. Since we only consider one slot, we simply denote the demand by D.
Any fee greater or equal to one has a trivial result where none of the customers makes AR. No fee or
a negative fee have the trivial result of all customers making AR. Hence, in our analysis, we consider
only fees between zero and one (i.e., 0 < C < 1).
We note that the demand seen by a customer may be different from that seen by an external observer
(the provider, for instance). Indeed, the fact that a customer seeks service in a given time slot affects
his estimation of the number of other customers seeking service in that time slot. On the one hand,
a customer is more likely to fall in a slot with large demand than in one with small demand. On the
other hand, he must exclude himself. This phenomenon is known as the discrete case of the waiting
time paradox (or residual life paradox). We define D˜ as the number of customers seen by a customer
beside himself. The probability distribution function (PDF) of D˜ is known to be [Avineri 2004]:
P
(
D˜ = j
)
= P (D = j + 1)
(j + 1)
E[D]
. (1)
The following lemma states that each customer makes his decision upon realizing that service is
required.
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Fig. 2. Example of a realization of the demand in a given slot. The service starts at (normalized) lead time 0. As users have
greater (normalized) lead times, they have the opportunity to reserve a server earlier.
LEMMA 4.1. For all customers, making AR when realizing that service is required yields at least
the same payoff as making AR later on.
PROOF. In all three models, if a customer makes AR when all servers are already reserved, his
payoff will be the same as if making AR later on. If a customer makes AR when there is at least one
free server, his payoff will be 1 − C. If he makes a reservation at a later point, his payoff will be the
same if there is still at least one free server. If there is no more server available, his payoff will be zero
in the first and third models and negative in the second model.
Given a lead time γ, we set t = F (γ) and refer to it as the normalized lead time. Due to the probability
integral transformation theorem [Dodge 2006, p. 320], we know that t is a random variable, uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. Note that F (γ) is also the average fraction of customers with lead time smaller
than γ. Fig. 2 illustrates the notion of the normalized lead time.
For each game, we define a strategy function σ : t → [0, 1], which represents the probability that a
tagged customer with normalized lead time t ∈ [0, 1] makes AR. Since we consider only symmetric
equilibria, all customers follow the same strategy function. Through conditioning, given that there are
k other customers with normalized lead times t1, . . . , tk that follow strategy σ, the tagged customer
can find his probability of getting service (we denote that event by S) for each action he chooses. His
probability to get service, when choosing action α ∈ {AR,AR′} is
P (S|t, α, σ) = P
(
D˜ < N
)
+
∞∑
k=N
P
(
D˜ = k
)∫ 1
t1=0
· · ·
∫ 1
tk=0
P (S|t, α, k, t1, . . . , tk, σ) dt1 · · · dtk. (2)
The first term in (2) is the probability that the number of customers (beside the tagged customer)
is smaller than N . In this case, all customers get service, regardless of their decisions. The second
term is the weighted sum of the probabilities of getting service when the number of customers (beside
the tagged customer) is at least N . In this case, the probability that the tagged customer gets service
depends on his action and on the strategy followed by the other customers and their lead times (note
that the PDF of the random variable tj equals 1, for each j ∈ {1, .., k}). As shown in the sequel, deriving
an explicit expression for P (S|t, α, k, t1, . . . , tk, σ) is not required for the equilibria analysis.
Given the model and strategy function followed by all other customers, one can express the expected
payoff, denoted Uσ (t, α), for each action α by multiplying P (S|ti, α, σ−i) and 1− P (S|ti, α, σ−i) with the
relevant payoffs, as summarized in Table I. For example, for the second model:
Uσ (t, AR) = P (S|t, AR, σ) (1− C) + (1− P (S|t, AR, σ)) (−C) (3)
and
Uσ
(
t, AR′
)
= P
(
S|t, AR′, σ) · 1 + (1− P (S|t, AR′, σ)) · 0. (4)
At equilibrium, each customer chooses an action that maximizes his expected payoff. Thus, we define
an equilibrium strategy (i.e., a strategy that leads to equilibrium) as follows.
Definition 4.2. Strategy σ is an equilibrium strategy if the following holds for any normalized lead
time t ∈ [0, 1]:
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(1) If σ (t) = 0 then Uσ (t, AR) ≤ Uσ (t, AR′).
(2) If 0 < σ (t) < 1 then Uσ (t, AR) = Uσ (t, AR′).
(3) If σ (t) = 1 then Uσ (t, AR) ≥ Uσ (t, AR′).
That is, at equilibrium, a customer chooses the actionAR′, only if he is (weakly) better off not making
AR; he randomizes his action, only if he is indifferent between the two outcomes; and he chooses the
action AR, only if he is (weakly) better off making AR.
Next we show that at equilibrium all customers follow the same threshold strategy, defined below.
Definition 4.3. A threshold strategy has the following structure:
σ (t) =
{
1 if t > τ
0 if t ≤ τ.
where τ is a threshold value in the interval (0, 1].
LEMMA 4.4. In the unobservable models, at equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold strategy.
PROOF. Consider a tagged customer with normalized lead time t and assume that the rest of the
customers follow a strategy function σ. All customers that do not make AR have the same probability
to get service. Thus, Uσ (t, AR′) does not depend on t. For brevity, we denote this value by β. From
Lemma 4.1, we know that the expected payoff when making AR Uσ (t, AR) is a non-decreasing function
of t. Hence, the two expected payoffs can intersect at most once.
If Uσ (t, AR) < β for all t ∈ [0, 1], then σ is an equilibrium strategy only if none of the customers
makes AR (i.e., it is a threshold strategy with τ = 1). If Uσ (t, AR) > β for all t ∈ [0, 1], then σ is an
equilibrium strategy only if all customers make AR (i.e., it is a threshold strategy with τ = 0). However,
if all customers make AR, a customer with normalized lead time 0+ has the same probability to get
service with and without AR. Thus, he is better off not making AR. Therefore, an equilibrium where
all customers make AR cannot exist.
Finally, if the two expected payoff functions intersect, they can either intersect at a single point t0 or
along an interval [t2, t1]. In the first case, Uσ (t, AR) < β for all t < t0 and Uσ (t, AR) > β for all t > t0.
Thus, in this case, σ is an equilibrium strategy only if it is a threshold strategy with τ = t0.
In the second case, Uσ (t, AR) has the same value for all t ∈ [t2, t1], which can only happen if
σ(t) = 0,∀t ∈ [t2, t1] (we ignore the case of σ (t) 6= 0 over a measure zero subset of [t2, t1], since the
probability that a customer will have a normalized lead time within this subset is zero). Since none of
the customers make AR in the interval [t2, t1], and since Uσ (t, AR) < β for all t < t2 and Uσ (t, AR) > β
for all t > t1, we conclude that σ is an equilibrium strategy only if it is a threshold strategy with
τ = t1.
LEMMA 4.5. In the observable model, at equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold strategy.
PROOF. Suppose a customer is informed that a server is available. For this case, we show that the
expected payoff of not making AR is a non-increasing function of the normalized lead time while the
payoff of making AR is fixed to 1 − C. Using similar arguments as in the unobservable case, one can
then show that the only possible equilibrium is a threshold strategy.
We define D˜AR(t) as the number of reservations made before the normalized lead time t. We need
to show that for any t1 > t2, regardless of the strategy σ followed by the rest of the customers, the
following holds:
P
(
S|t1, D˜AR(t1) < N,AR′
)
≤ P
(
S|t2, D˜AR(t2) < N,AR′
)
, (5)
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where the left (right) hand side is the probability of a customer with normalized lead time t1 (t2) to get
service, given that the number of reservations made earlier (i.e., by customers with greater lead times)
is smaller than N and the chosen action is AR′. Using conditional probability, Eq. (5) can be rewritten
as
P
(
S, D˜AR(t1) < N |t1, AR′
)
P
(
D˜AR(t1) < N |t1, AR′
) ≤ P
(
S, D˜AR(t2) < N |t2, AR′
)
P
(
D˜AR(t2) < N |t2, AR′
) . (6)
The event {S} is contained in the event {D˜AR(·) < N}. Moreover, under action AR′ the probability
to get service does not depend on the lead time. We deduce that the numerators on both sides of the
equation above are equal.
Since D˜AR(t2) is stochastically larger or equal to D˜AR(t1) when t2 < t1, we deduce that the denom-
inator of the right hand side of Eq. (6) is smaller or equal to the denominator of the left hand side of
Eq. (6). Thus, we have shown that Eq. (5) holds.
After showing that a threshold strategy is the only possible equilibrium strategy, we distinguish
between two types of equilibria.
Definition 4.6. None-make-AR is an equilibrium in which all customers follow a threshold strategy
with threshold τe = 1.
Definition 4.7. Some-make-AR is an equilibrium in which all customers follow a threshold strategy
with threshold τe ∈ (0, 1).
Using the results obtained so far, we find next the equilibria structure for each model separately.
4.2 Equilibria structure
In this section, we show that different ranges of fees lead to different equilibria. The following theorem
summarizes the main results.
THEOREM 4.8. For each model i = 1, 2, 3, there exist quantities C and Ci ≥ C, such that:
—If 0 < C < C, there is at least one some-make-AR equilibrium.
—If C < C < Ci, there is a none-make-AR equilibrium and at least two some-make-AR equilibria.
—If C > Ci, none-make-AR is the unique equilibrium.
For simplicity, we do not consider the boundary cases C = C and C = Ci in our discussion.
4.2.1 Unobservable model 1. We consider the first unobservable model. For each type of equilib-
ria, we determine the range of fees in which they may occur.
Some-make-AR equilibria. If all customers follow a strategy with threshold τe, that strategy is an
equilibrium strategy if and only if a customer with normalized lead time τe (referred to as a threshold
customer) is indifferent between the actions AR and AR′. We denote piAR (τe) the probability that a
threshold customer gets service upon chosen action AR, and piAR′ (τe) the probability that a threshold
customer gets service upon chosen action AR′. Hence, a strategy with threshold τe is an equilibrium if
and only if
(1− C)piAR (τe) = piAR′ (τe) , (7)
where the left hand side of Eq. (7) is the expected payoff of AR and the right hand side is the expected
payoff of AR′. Using Eq. (7), we express the fee as a function of the threshold
C1 (τe) , 1− piAR
′ (τe)
piAR (τe)
. (8)
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Next, we develop the expressions piAR (τe) and piAR′ (τe). The former expression corresponds to the
probability that either the demand is at most N or the demand exceeds N but fewer than N customers
make AR. The number of customers making AR, given D˜ = j with j ≥ N , is a random variable that
follows a binomial distribution. The number of trials is j and the success probability is 1 − τe. The
probability that the threshold customer gets service is equal to the probability that the number of
successes is at most N − 1. By summing this probability over all possible values of j we get:
piAR (τe) = P
(
D˜ < N
)
+
∞∑
j=N
N−1∑
i=0
P
(
D˜ = j
)
(1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
. (9)
Likewise, we have
piAR′ (τe) = P
(
D˜ < N
)
+
∞∑
j=N
N−1∑
i=0
P
(
D˜ = j
)
(1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
N − i
j + 1− i . (10)
In that case, if the demand exceeds N but fewer than N customers make AR, service is not guaranteed.
Given a demand j and a number of reservations i, the probability to get service without AR is the ratio
of the number of unreserved servers N − i to the number of customers that did not make AR, j + 1− i.
Next, we prove that these two functions are continuous.
LEMMA 4.9. The functions piAR′ and piAR are continuous functions of τe in the range [0, 1].
PROOF. Starting with Eq. (9) and ignoring the first term of the function which does not depend on τe,
we need to show that the second term is continuous. The inner sum of the second term is continuous,
since it is a finite sum of polynomial functions. To prove that the outer sum is continuous, we use
Cauchy’s uniform convergence criterion [Trench 2003]. We shall show that for any  > 0 there exists
an integer M such that
sup
0≤τe≤1
m∑
j=n
N−1∑
i=0
P
(
D˜ = j
)
(1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
<  ∀n,m ≥M. (11)
The above expression is upper bounded by P
(
n ≤ D˜ ≤ m
)
which in turn is upper bounded by P
(
D˜ ≥ n
)
.
For any discrete distribution and  > 0 there exists M such that P
(
D˜ ≥ n
)
<  for any n > M . Thus,
we have shown that Eq. (11) holds true. Since, for any τe ∈ [0, 1], piAR(τe) ≥ piAR′(τe), the proof is also
valid for piAR′ .
Since both piAR′ and piAR are continuous and positive in the range τe ∈ [0, 1], we deduce that C1 (τe)
is a continuous function in this range. Next, we observe that if all customers make AR, then the
probability of service of a customer with lead time zero (i.e., the last arriving customer) does not depend
on his decision. Hence, C1 (0) = 0. In any other case, the probability to get service is greater when
making AR. Hence, C1 (τe) > 0 for any 0 < τe ≤ 1. We denote the supremum value of C1 (τe) as
C1 , sup
0<τe<1
C1 (τe). (12)
Since the equation C1(τe) = C has a solution if and only if C is smaller that the supremum value of
C1(τe), we conclude that a some-make-AR equilibrium exists if C < C1 and does not exist if C > C1.
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Fig. 3. An example with N = 10 servers, Poisson distributed demand with mean λ = 15 and AR fee C = 0.45. The line C and
the function C(τe) intersect twice. Hence, there are two some-make-AR equilibria. Since C(1) < C, there is also a none-make-AR
equilibrium.
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes AR, all have the same expected payoff
piAR′ (1). A customer that deviates gets service with probability piAR (1) = 1 and his payoff is 1 − C.
Thus, if the provider chooses a fee such that 1− C < piAR′ (1), then none of the customers will have an
incentive to deviate. On the other hand, if 1−C > piAR′ (1), then all the customers will have an incentive
to deviate. By defining C , C1(1), we conclude that if C > C, then a none-make-AR equilibrium exists.
If C < C, then a none-make-AR equilibrium does not exist.
By definition C1 ≥ C. Therefore, we have shown that for any value of 0 < C < 1, at least one
equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if the interval I =
(
C,C1
)
is not empty (i.e., the supremum point is
not reached at τ = 1), then for any C ∈ I, the equation C = C1 (τe) must have at least two solutions
due to the continuity of the function. Therefore, any fee C ∈ I has at least two different some-make-AR
equilibria (the exact number of some-make-AR equilibria depends on the number of maximal points of
the function C (τe)). See Figure 3 for an illustration.
4.2.2 Unobservable model 2. In this section, we show that the second game has the same equi-
libria structure as the first one, but with different ranges.
Some-make-AR equilibria. If all the customers follow a strategy with threshold τe, the probability
to get service with or without making AR is calculated in the same way as in the previous model. Thus,
the functions piAR and piAR′ can be also used in the analysis of this model. As in the first game, at
a some-make-AR equilibrium, the threshold customer is indifferent between the two actions AR and
AR′. Thus,
piAR (τe)− C = piAR′ (τe) , (13)
where the left hand side of the equation is the expected payoff of AR, while the right hand side is the
expected payoff AR′. In this model, the fee as a function of the threshold is:
C2 (τe) , piAR (τe)− piAR′ (τe) . (14)
We define
C2 , sup
0<τe<1
C2 (τe). (15)
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Fig. 4. The fee function in the two unobservable models with N = 10. The demand is a Poisson random variable with mean
λ = 10.
As is the first model, C2 (0) = 0 and C2 (τe) > 0 for any τe > 0. Thus, a some-make-AR equilibrium
exists if C < C2 and does not exist if C > C2.
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes AR, then the expected payoffs of not
making AR and the expected payoff of deviating are the same as in the first model. Therefore, the
range of fees that have a none-make-AR equilibrium is the same as in the first model.
In conclusion, the difference between the analyses of the two games is that C1 may be different from
C2. From Eq. (8) and (14), we obtain
C1 (τe)
C2 (τe)
=
1
piAR (τe)
, ∀τe ∈ (0, 1). (16)
In any some-make-AR equilibrium, the probability to get service is smaller than one. Hence, for any
τe ∈ (0, 1), C1 > C2 (as illustrated in Figure 4). This result indicates that if the provider is aiming to
achieve a certain fraction of customers making AR, she will have to advertise a lower fee if using the
second model.
4.2.3 Observable model. In this model, customers make decisions not only based on statistical
information but also based on the knowledge that a server is currently available at the desired slot.
Next, we show that this additional information has no effect on decisions of customers and each fee
leads to the same set of equilibria as in the first unobservable model.
Some-make-AR equilibrium. Consider the first model and a some-make-AR equilibrium with
threshold τe, but assume that the threshold customer is being informed that a server is available,
namely D˜AR(τe) < N . If making AR, his payoff is 1 − C. The expected payoff of not making AR is
P
(
S|τe, D˜AR(τe) < N,AR′
)
, which is the probability of the threshold customer to get service, given
that all customers follow a strategy with threshold τe, there is at least one free server and the decision
AR′. Next, we show that
P
(
S|τe, D˜AR(τe) < N,AR′
)
=
piAR′ (τe)
piAR (τe)
. (17)
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By conditioning on the event {D˜AR(τe) < N} we get
P
(
S|τe, D˜AR(τe) < N,AR′
)
=
P
(
S, D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
)
P
(
D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
) . (18)
Since a customer cannot get service when observing no free servers, the numerator P (S,DAR(τe) < N |τe, AR′)
is equal to P (S|τe, AR′) which is equal by definition to piAR′ (τe).
The denominator P
(
D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
)
is the probability that the threshold customer will see the
event {D˜AR(τe) < N} (the fact that he does not make AR is irrelevant). This in turn can be rephrased
as the probability to get service when making AR exactly at the threshold point without knowing if
there are free servers, which is the definition of piAR (τe). Thus, P
(
D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
)
= piAR (τe).
We have shown that Eq. (17) holds true for any τe. Using Eq. (7), we deduce that the threshold
customer stays indifferent between the two actions after being informed that a server is available.
Hence, we conclude that if a threshold strategy is an equilibrium strategy in the first model, it is also
an equilibrium strategy in the third model.
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes AR, the expected payoffs of not mak-
ing AR and the expected payoff of deviating are the same as in the first and second models. Therefore,
the range of fees that have a none-make-AR equilibrium is the same as in the other two models.
By noticing that the profit of the provider is defined in the same way in both models, that is, the
number of customers that make AR and being served multiplied by the fee C, we obtain the following:
THEOREM 4.10. In AR games, if AR fees are charged only from served customers, then informing
customers that servers are available or hiding this information lead to the same equilibria.
5. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we compare between the maximum possible expected profits in the two unobservable
models. We define the maximum possible profit for model i = 1, 2 as
R∗i = sup
0<τe<1
Ri (τe). (19)
Under some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τe, the number of reservations is DAR (τe) or sim-
ply DAR from now and on. In the first model, the expected profit per server is the expected number of
reserved servers, multiplied by the fee and normalized by the number of servers N :
R1 (τe) =
E[min (DAR, N)]C1 (τe)
N
. (20)
In the second model, it is the expected number of reservations, multiplied by the fee and normalized
by N :
R2 (τe) =
E[D] (1− τe)C2 (τe)
N
. (21)
By comparing the two expressions, we state the following result:
THEOREM 5.1. In AR games, the maximum possible profit, at equilibrium, is greater when charging
the AR fee only from customers that get service and not from all customers that make AR requests.
PROOF. We prove the theorem by showing that for any given threshold, the first model yields greater
profit than the second. Namely, we show that for any value of τe ∈ (0, 1) the following holds:
R1 (τe) > R2 (τe) . (22)
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From Eqs. (20), (21) and (16) we obtain that showing that R1(τe) > R2(τe) is equivalent to showing
that
E[min (DAR, N)]− E[D] (1− τe)piAR (τe) > 0. (23)
First, we expand the first term of (23):
E[min (DAR, N)] =
N∑
i=0
P (DAR = i) i+
∞∑
i=N+1
P (DAR = i)N. (24)
The PDF of DAR is
P (DAR = i) =
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) (1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
. (25)
Combining Eq. (24) and (25) we get
E[min (DAR, N)] =
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) (1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
i+
∞∑
i=N+1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) (1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
N. (26)
Next, we expand piAR (τe):
piAR (τe) = P
(
D˜ < N
)
+
N−1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=N
P
(
D˜ = j
)
(1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
=
N−1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j + 1) (j + 1)
E[D]
(1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
=
N−1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=i+1
P (D = j) j
E[D]
(1− τe)i τ j−i−1e
(
j − 1
i
)
=
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) j
E[D]
(1− τe)i−1 τ j−ie
(
j − 1
i− 1
)
=
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) j
E[D]
(1− τe)i−1 τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
i
j
. (27)
The explanation for Eq. (27) is as follows. We start from Eq. (9). We merge the two terms in Eq. (9)
and substitute P
(
D˜ = j
)
by the right hand side of Eq. (1). Next, we replace j by j − 1 and start the
sum at j = i instead of j = i+ 1. Next, we do a similar change with the variable i. Finally, we multiple
and divide the expression by
(
j
i
)
.
In the next step, we multiply both sides of Eq. (27) by E[D] (1− τe):
E[D] (1− τe)piAR (τe) =
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) (1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
i. (28)
Finally, we substitute the first term of the left hand side of Eq. (23) with the right hand side of Eq. (26)
and the second term of the left hand side of Eq. (23) with the right hand side of Eq. (28). We then get
E[min (DAR, N)]− E[D] (1− τe)piAR (τe) =
∞∑
i=N+1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) (1− τe)i τ j−ie
(
j
i
)
N > 0, (29)
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Fig. 5. An example with N = 15 servers and Poisson distributed demand with mean λ = 20. To obtain the maximum possible
profit, the fee C must be greater than C.
which completes the proof.
The result of Theorem 5.1 is reassuring, since a mechanism that charges reservation fees only from
customers getting service (first model) appears as more fair than a mechanism that charges reservation
fees from all customers making AR requests (second model). Further, one may argue that the demand
for service would decrease when under the latter charging scheme. The theorem proves that the latter
scheme is detrimental for the provider even if the demand for service were not reduced.
6. PRICE OF CONSERVATISM
In the previous sections, we showed that in order to maximize the profit, the provider should choose
the first or the third model, which yield the same profit for any given fee. In this section, we assume
that the first model is chosen and investigate different fees and their impact on the profit.
By means of example, we next show that the fee that maximizes the profit may yield more than one
equilibrium, where one of them yields zero profit.
Example 6.1. Consider a system with 15 servers and a Poisson distributed demand with parameter
(mean) 20. In this case, the maximum profit per resource is R∗1 = 0.41 and it is achieved with fee
C∗1 = 0.47. Since C = 0.26, if charging C∗1 , then none-make-AR is also an equilibrium. Hence, charging
C∗1 may yield the maximum possible profit but may also yield zero profit. The profit and fee functions
are illustrated in Figure 5.
If the fee that yields the maximum possible profit is not unique, the provider may prefer a fee with
smaller but guaranteed profit. In order to weigh the different options, we propose the metric of price
of conservatism (PoC). In the rest of this section we formally define the term PoC and derive it for
different settings. Since we only deal with the first model, the model index is removed in this section.
In order to have a positive guaranteed profit, the provider must choose a fee smaller than C. Further-
more, if that fee has more than one equilibrium, then the guaranteed profit is defined as the minimum
between the profits of the different some-make-AR equilibria. We define ZC as the set of some-make-AR
equilibria of the fee C, namely, ZC = {τe : C(τe) = C, 0 < τe < 1}. The maximum expected guaranteed
profit is defined as follows:
R∗g = sup
0<C<C
(
inf
τe∈ZC
R (τe)
)
. (30)
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The following definition captures the potential profit loss resulting from a conservative pricing deci-
sion.
Definition 6.2. The price of conservatism (PoC) is the ratio of the expected maximum possible profit
R∗ to the expected maximum guaranteed profit R∗g.
Next, we evaluate the provider’s profit and PoC under the assumption that the demand D is a
Poisson random variable with parameter λ. We denote the number of customers not making AR by
DAR′ . Due to the properties of Poisson games [Myerson 1998], DAR and DAR′ are independent Poisson
random variables with parameter λ (1− τe) and λτe, respectively. Furthermore, the total number of
customers and the number of customers making each action, as seen by a customer if not counting
himself, has the same distributions as D, DAR and DAR′ respectively.
6.1 Single-server Case
We start with the special caseN = 1. If all customers follow a strategy with threshold τe, the probability
that the threshold customer will get service is:
(1) If making AR:
piAR (τe) = e
−λ(1−τe), (31)
which is the probability that beside the customer with lead time equals to the threshold, no one
makes AR (i.e., the lead times of all other customers are smaller than the threshold).
(2) If not making AR:
piAR′ (τe) = e
−λ(1−τe)
∞∑
i=0
e−λτe (λτe)
i
i!
1
i+ 1
=
e−λ
(−1 + eλτe)
λτe
, (32)
which is the probability that none of the customers makes AR, multiplied by the probability to get
service given that none of the customers makes AR.
By substituting Eqs. (31) and (32) in Eq. (8) we get
C (τe) =
e−λτe + λτe − 1
λτe
. (33)
LEMMA 6.3. For the case N = 1, C (τe) is a monotonic increasing function in the interval τe ∈ (0, 1).
PROOF. The derivative of C (τe) is:
∂C
∂τe
=
e−λτe
(
eλτe − 1− λτe
)
λτ2e
. (34)
Since λτ2e ≥ 0, e−λτe ≥ 0 and eλτe−1−λτe > 0 for any λ > 0 and τe ∈ (0, 1), we conclude that ∂C∂τe > 0.
From the lemma, we infer that C = C (1). Thus, by definition,
C = C =
e−λ + λ− 1
λ
. (35)
Therefore, for any fee smaller than C there is no none-make-AR equilibrium. Furthermore, for any
value of C between zero and C, the equation C = C (τe) has a single solution and therefore the some-
make-AR equilibrium is unique. The result is stated in the following theorem.
THEOREM 6.4. In a single server system the equilibrium is unique and its type is:
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Fig. 6. An example with N = 1 server and mean demand λ = 1.2. The reservation fee C (τe) is a monotonic increasing function
of the threshold τe. The profit function R (τe) is concave with maximum value achieved at τ∗e = 0.523.
— Some-make-AR equilibrium if 0 < C < e
−λ+λ−1
λ .
—None-make-AR equilibrium if C > e
−λ+λ−1
λ .
The expected profit R (τe) in the case N = 1 is equal to the probability that at least one customer makes
AR multiplied by the fee:
R (τe) =
(
1− e−λ(1−τe)
)(e−λτe + λτe − 1
λτe
)
. (36)
Since the equilibrium is unique, the provider will maximize her expected profit by choosing C∗ = C (τ∗e )
where:
τ∗e = argmax
0<τe<1
R (τe). (37)
Due to the uniqueness of the equilibrium, R∗ = R∗g = R (τ∗e ). Hence:
COROLLARY 6.5. In a single server system, the price of conservatism is 1.
Example 6.6. We consider a system withN = 1 server and average demand λ = 1.2. For this system,
the maximum fee that leads to a some-make-AR equilibrium is C = 0.417. The optimal fee is obtained
when τ∗e = 0.523 (i.e., when on average 47.7% of the customers make AR). This threshold is achieved
when the provider sets a fee C∗ = 0.257. The provider’s expected profit in this case is R (τ∗e ) = 0.112.
Figure 6 shows the fee and profit as functions of the threshold τe.
6.2 Many-server Case
In this section we study the behavior of the system when the number of servers goes to infinity. We
distinguish between overloaded and underloaded systems.
6.2.1 Overloaded system. We start with an overloaded system and we show that the PoC is a func-
tion of the ratio between the average demand and the number of servers.
THEOREM 6.7. In an overloaded many-server system, where λ = αN and α > 1, the following holds:
lim
N→∞
R∗ = 1. (38)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. 1 , No. 1 , Article 1, Publication date: January 1 .
Advance Reservation Games • 1:17
lim
N→∞
R∗g = 1−
1
α
. (39)
Hence,
PoC =
α
α− 1 . (40)
PROOF. In order to prove Eq. (38), we show that if the fee approaches one from below, there is a
some-make-AR equilibrium where almost all servers are reserved.
Let τe = 1 − 1/α, hence DAR is Poisson distributed with parameter N . The probability that the
threshold customer gets service is equivalent to the probability that DAR will be smaller than N ,
which in turn is equal to
lim
N→∞
P (DAR < N) =
1
2
. (41)
Next, we show that when τe = 1− 1/α, the probability to get service if not making AR tends to zero
as N → ∞. First recall Chebyshev’s inequality which states that for any random variable X and real
positive number Q
P (|X − EX|) ≥ Q) ≤ VarX
Q2
. (42)
Setting Q = δ
√
N where δ is a positive real number, we get from Eq. (42)
P
(
|DAR −N |) ≥ δ
√
N
)
≤ 1
δ2
. (43)
In the same way, setting Q = 
√
(α− 1)N where  is a positive real number, we get
P
(
|DAR′ − (α− 1)N |) ≥ 
√
(α− 1)N
)
≤ 1
2
. (44)
Hence,
P
(
DAR′ ≤ (α− 1)N − 
√
(α− 1)N
)
≤ 1
2
. (45)
From Eqs. (43) and (45), we deduce that with probability one the number of free servers DAR −N is
O
(√
N
)
while DAR′ is (α− 1)N +O
(√
N
)
. Hence, for any α > 1, as N →∞, a customer that does not
make AR will get service with probability zero.
We showed that when N → ∞ and τe is such that on average N customers make AR, the expected
payoff of the threshold customer tends to 0.5(1− C) if making AR and to zero if not making AR. Thus,
a strategy with threshold τe is an equilibrium only if C tends to one. Therefore, we conclude that there
exists a value of τe such that on average N customers make AR while the fee is almost one. Therefore,
in an overloaded system:
lim
N→∞
R∗ = 1. (46)
Next, we show that Eq. (39) holds. If none of the customers makes AR, they all have the same
probability to get service. Again, due to Chebyshev’s inequality, for any δ > 1, the following holds:
P
(
αN − δ
√
αN ≤ D ≤ αN + δ
√
αN
)
≤ 1
δ2
. (47)
In other words, with probability one the demand is αN + O(
√
N). In this case, as N → ∞ the fraction
of customers getting service converges to 1/α. Hence,
lim
N→∞
piAR′(1) =
1
α
. (48)
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On the other hand, when deviating from the none-make-AR strategy, the probability to get service is
piAR(1) = 1. Thus,
lim
N→∞
C = 1− 1
α
. (49)
Next, we show that in the overloaded system, if C < C, then in any some-make-AR equilibrium
almost all servers are reserved. By contradiction, we assume that there exists a some-make-AR equi-
librium with threshold τe such that, C(τe) < 1−1/α and E[DAR] = δN where 0 < δ < 1. In this case, the
probability of the threshold customer to get service if making AR converges to one as N → ∞. Thus,
his expected payoff is greater than 1/α. If not making AR, his probability to get service is smaller than
1/α (which is the probability to get service if none makes AR). Therefore, the expected payoff of the
threshold customer is greater if making AR than if not making AR, which contradicts the definition
of a some-make-AR equilibrium. Hence, we have shown that the assumption cannot hold true. Thus,
with probability one, the number of reservation will be at least N + o (N). Therefore, with probability
one, the ratio between the number of free servers and the number of servers is zero. The provider will
maximize her guaranteed profit by advertising a fee just below C and we finally obtain
lim
N→∞
R∗g = 1−
1
α
. (50)
The results indicate that if α is almost one and none of the customers makes AR then, in order to
persuade customers to deviate, the provider will have to advertise a fee close to zero. Such fee will
yield almost zero profit per resource. In other words, although there is an equilibrium that yields a
profit per resource of almost one, if initially none of the customers makes AR, any fee the provider will
advertise will not significantly increase her profit.
6.2.2 Underloaded system. In an underloaded many-server system we show that any fee leads to
an asymptotically zero profit.
THEOREM 6.8. In an underloaded many-server system, where λ = αN and α < 1, the following
holds:
lim
N→∞
R∗ = R∗g = 0. (51)
PROOF. Given any α < 1 and any  > 0, we can find a large enough N such that
P (D > N) ≤ . (52)
In other words, for large enough N , the probability that the demand will exceed the number of
servers tends to zero. In this case, the dominant strategy of all customers, regardless of their lead
time, is not to make AR. Hence,
lim
N→∞
C = 0. (53)
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we introduce advance reservation games: games where customers are asked to pay a fee
if they wish to reserve a future resource in advance. First, we show that, at equilibrium, either all
customers with lead times greater than some threshold make AR or none of them makes AR. Next,
we prove the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium and find the range of fees that determine
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each equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that a fee may yield more than one equilibrium, with one of
them bringing zero profit to the provider. Next, we show that providing information to the customers
about the availability of servers has no impact on the game outcome. However, charging a fee from all
customers attempting to reserve a server can only reduce the provider’s profits.
In order of a provider to decide on a proper AR fee, we propose the concept of Price of Conservatism
(PoC) which corresponds to the ratio of the maximum possible expected profit to the maximum guar-
anteed expected profit. A greater PoC indicates greater potential profit loss if the provider opts to be
conservative. We focus on the models where charges are collected only from the customers getting ser-
vice and assume that the demand is Poisson distributed. First, we show that in a single server system
the equilibrium is unique. Thus, PoC = 1 and the provider experiences no loss. Next, we show that in
an overloaded many-server system where the average demand is λ = αN with α > 1, the maximum
possible expected profit tends to one, while, the maximum guaranteed expected profit tends to 1− 1/α
as N →∞. Hence PoC = α/(α− 1), which increases in an unbounded fashion as α approaches 1 from
above. Finally, we show that in an underloaded many-server system, the provider cannot make profit.
The extensions of advance reservation games to more complex settings (e.g., with users differing in
their utilities) and analysis of PoC in other systems represent interesting directions for future work.
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